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Abstract—Developers of some safety critical systems construct a 
safety case. Developers changing a system during development or after 
release must analyse the change’s impact on the safety case. Evidence 
might be invalidated by changes to the system design, operation, or 
environmental context. Assumptions valid in one context might be 
invalid elsewhere. The impact of change might not be obvious. This 
paper proposes a method to facilitate safety case maintenance by 
highlighting the impact of changes. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Developers of some safety critical systems construct a safety case 
comprising both safety evidence (e.g. safety anal-yses, software 
inspections, or functional tests) and a safety argument explaining that 
evidence. The safety argument shows which claims the developer uses 
each item of evidence to support and how those claims, in turn, support 
broader claims about system behaviour, hazards addressed, and, 
ultimately, acceptable safety. Changes to the system during or after 
development might invalidate safety evidence or argument. Evidence 
might no longer support the developers’ claims because it reflects old 
development artefacts or old assumptions about operation or the 
operating environment. In the updated system, existing safety claims 
might be nonsense, no longer reflect operational intent, or be contradicted 
by new data. To maintain the safety case after the system is changed, 
developers must analyse the change’s impact. This analysis is 
traditionally done by hand: developers determine whether the evidence 
still supports the claims made of it, check to see whether new or updated 
safety requirements are reflected in the argument, and manually review 
the argument’s logic. In this paper, we propose a method to facilitate 
safety case change impact analysis by automatically highlighting some 
kinds of impacts. 
 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume in this paper that safety 
arguments are recorded in the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN)  
[2]. However, the method we propose might (with suitable 
adaptations) be suitable for use with other graphical assurance 
argument notations. 
 
II. OUR PROPOSAL  
 
A complete approach to managing safety case change would 
include both (a) mechanisms to structure the argument so as to 
contain the impact of predicted changes and (b) means of assessing 
the impact of change on all parts of the argument. In this paper, we 
focus on identifying the evidence that must be updated to reflect any 
given change. 
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To facilitate identifying the evidence impacted by change, we 
propose storing additional information in the safety argu-ment. 
We propose annotating each reference to a development artefact 
(e.g. an architecture specification) in a goal or context element 
with an artefact version number. We also propose annotating each 
solution element with: 
 
1) An evidence version number  
2) An input manifest identifying the inputs (including 
version) from which the evidence was produced   
3) The lifecycle phase during which the evidence ob-
tained (e.g. Software Architecture Design)   
4) A safety standard reference to the clause in the 
applicable standard (if any) requiring the evidence (and 
setting out safety integrity level requirements)  
 
With this data, we can perform a number of automated 
checks to identify items of evidence impacted by a change. 
For example: 
 
1) We can determine when two different versions of the same 
item of evidence are cited in the same argument   
2) We can identify out-of-date evidence by searching for 
input manifests m = {(a1, v1) , ..., (an, vn)} and artefact 
versions (a, v) such that 9i • a = ai ^ v > vi  
3) Where we know a particular artefact has changed, we can 
search for input manifests containing old versions  
 
If we had further information which inputs were used to produce 
each input listed in each input manifest, each input that was used to 
produce those, and so on, we could extend checks (2) and (3) above 
to indirect inputs. For example, suppose that life testing is used to 
establish the reliability of a component, that this component and its 
reliability appear in a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), 
and that the FMEA results are used in a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). 
With the additional information, we could compute a closure of the 
FTA’s input manifest that would include the life testing results. 
 
Other analyses may be possible. For example, we suggest storing 
the safety standard reference to facilitate analysis of impacts that 
change the safety integrity level of a requirement. However, we have 
not yet thought these through. 
 
III. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE  
 
To illustrate our proposal, consider how the analysis might work 
on a sample system. Figure  1 presents part of an 
assurance argument we built for a specimen safety critical system we 
built in prior work  [3]. The Fuel Level Estimation System (FLES) is 
meant to monitor fuel levels to prevent loss of engine power due to 
running out of fuel. (Running out of fuel is a serious problem in 
heavy road vehicles because steering and braking mechanisms are 
powered by the engine; loss of engine power while driving could 
result in an accident.) 
 
The argument fragment concerns model checking anal-yses of 
the system architecture  [3]. The FLES architec-ture, specified in 
the Architecture Analysis and Design Lan-guage (AADL)  [1], 
comprises five threads: SoftwareIN, FuelEstimation, 
FuelLevelWarning, Other_Functions and SoftwareOUT. These threads 
run on a single-core mi-croprocessor with non-preemptive 
scheduling. Using the UP-PAAL model checker, we verified that the 
system as spec-ified in the architecture is schedulable and free from 
live-lock and deadlock. Rectangular goal element G:LivelocksFree 
represents the claim that the architecture is free from live-lock. 
G:LivelocksFree’s connection to round solution element S:CtrlFloAn 
shows that this claim is supported by the control flow analysis done 
using the model checker.  
The green elements in Figure  1 represent the annotations 
described in Section II. (These need not necessarily be pre-sented to 
the user in visual depictions.) Let us consider an example change 
scenario to illustrate how this information aids safety case change 
impact analysis. Suppose that the architec-ture was simplified by 
removing the FuelEstimation thread and moving the tasks it contains to 
the FuelLevelWarning thread. Suppose that an engineer making this 
change had up-dated the artefact version annotation(s) in part of the 
argument referring to the functional behaviour of in those threads. An 
automated implementation of check (2) described in Section  II could 
highlight the need to re-run the control flow analysis as well. If the 
new version of the architecture is version 1.1, analysis of the manifest 
associated with S:CtrlFloAn would reveal evidence based on an older 
version of the architecture and tools could flag S:CtrlFloAn as out of 
date and suspect. 
 
Automated analysis might also highlight goal G:Estimator-
ArchFree because its artefact version annotation refers to an out-of-
date version of the AADL architecture. The goal and its supporting 
argument are suspect because they might refer to parts of the 
architecture that no longer exist or make claims about the architecture 
that are no longer true. 
 
IV. RELATED WORK 
 
Weaver, McDermid, and Kelly proposed characterising safety 
evidence according to, amongst other things, the type of technique 
that produced it (e.g., analysis, testing, inspection, etc.)  [4]. Their 
characterisation was meant to facilitate judg-ment of the sufficiency 
of the evidence. We propose a different characterisation of safety 
evidence with a different purpose. 
 
Tracking version information and using it to determine when 
artefacts are out of date is by no means new; make does this. Our 
contribution lies in applying this idea to safety arguments and 
safety case change impact analysis. 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
Maintaing safety arguments after implementing a system change 
is painstaking process. In this paper we propose a new 
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Fig. 1.  Model Checking Module — Argument Fragment  [3]. 
 
 
approach to facilitating safety case change impact analysis. In the 
approach, automated analysis of information given as annotations to 
the safety argument highlights suspect safety evidence to bring it to 
engineers’ attention. We illustrated the approach with an example 
drawn from an automotive system. 
 
We have not considered the full range of properties that we 
could check with automated analyses or the annotations 
necessary to support those analyses. We have likewise not yet 
studied the feasibility or value of such automated checks by 
implementing and applying them. We leave these efforts to 
future work. 
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